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PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 
FOR REFUSAL. TO. DEAL 
GEORG� J. ALEXANDER* 
Refusal to deal with non-complying customers has long been, a ' 
weapon in the arsenal of manufacturers bent op. establishing sebCmes 
which could not be bilaterally created because of the antitrust ia�.l 
Actually the weapon is greatly overrated, as many who were still 
optimistic about the device found out with the decision of the 
Parke-Davis case.2 Some be�eve, in fact, that ·it is entirely a dud.s 
At any rate, the countenneasures have grown with recent decisions. 
Parke-Davis was merely a reasrtion of the implications of, much 
earlier cases4 that the government could attack a scheme al�ough· 
it was· technically established through procedure which was more 
unilateral than bilateral. A newer threat lies in the potential of a 
suit by the customer punished for refusal to . comply. This article will 
� Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University. 
1. United States v. Colgate &: Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) has been generally 
interpreted· as sanctioning the action of a single trader, who is not a monop­
olist, in demanding customer adherence to a scheme which would violate the 
antitrust laws if accomplished by contractual, agreement. The distinction be­
tween legal and illegal demands turns on the ability of the single trader to 
have his demands characterized as unilaterally imposed rather than having 
the resultant conformity characterized as, the product of agreement; since the 
applicable' statutes interdict conduct only when it rises to at least a bilateral 
level. 
2. United States v. Parke, Davis &: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). In a civil suit 
instituted by the government, Parke-Davis was charged with violation of § 1 
)f the Sherman Act. As part of a price-maintenance scheme, poD had allegedly: I) discontinued sales to retailers which did not maintain prices, reinstituting 
Jealings when the retailers satisfied it that the prices would be maintained; 
�) instructed wholesalers, on pain of loss of their supplies, not to deal with 
-etailers which were cutting prices; 3) obtained verbal assurance of future 
:ompliance with the pricing policy from at least one retailer; and 4) assured 
:etailers that compliance with the pricing policy would be required of their 
:ompetitors as well as of them. The Supreme Court held the facts to be suRi­
:ient to require ,a judgment for the government. Without challenging the right 
,f a single trader to announce a price to be maintained and threaten to deal 
vith non-conformers, the Court found the enumerated acts to be tantamount 
o a combination or conspiracy thus supplying the duality required for a section 
verdict. Summarizing its review of previous cases, the' Court stated: "When 
he manufacturer's actions . . . go beyond mere announcement of his policy 
,nd the simple refusal to deal, and' he employs other means which effect, 
'dherence to his resale prices,' . • •  he has put together a combination in 
iolation of the Sherman Act." !d. at 44. . . 
3 .  Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting to Parke-Davis, Ibid., suggests that. the 
'pinion has sent the right to refuse to · deal as a means of establishing an 
therwise unlawful scheme to its demise. 
4. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., �57 U.S. 441 (1922); Unit�d States v. 
ausch and Lomb pptical Co., 321 V.S. 707 (1944). . '  
489 
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survey recent cases dealing with private actions brought by such 
customers. 
A few years ago the chances of succes of a dealer bringing a 
private action because of unilateral refusal to deal with him were 
minimal unless he could connect the refusal with -a scheme of mon­
opolization. I) The two most common reasons given by the courts for 
holding against private plaintiff;:, were: 1) the Jack of duality re­
quired under the applicable act6 and 2) the lack of public injury.7 
Recent cases do not lend themselves to such simple synthesis. 
Some courts, such as the court in Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft 
Shop,S appear to decide such cases in much the same way as they 
were decided in the past. The complaint, hi that case, alleged that: 
the defendants, a manufacturer. of patio furriiture, the manufac­
turer's local agent and a retail competitor of the plaintiff, were in­
volved ,hi price fixing. The manufacturer had allegedly accepted the 
retail price determined by· his agent and the defendant retailer and 
had made this the "suggested retail price" for his products. Both 
manufacturer and selling agent had then, according to the com­
plaint, demanded compliance with the price set and policed such 
comp1iance by sending shoppers to stores suspected of discounting. 
When discovered selling below the suggested price, plaintiff had 
been cut off from further sales. 
' 
Dismisg the complaint, the District Court ruled that the ac­
tions complained of did not affect interstate commerce arid "that 
there was no aHegation of public injury. Furthermore, the court 
pointed out, while the agreement between the manufacturer's agent 
5. A scheme of monopolization makes section 2 of the Sherman Act appli­
cable. Consequently, duality of action is not required and the supplier's conduct 
is sufficient to establish plaintiff's case. Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo 
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). Plaintiffs relying on unilateral refusal 
to deal for failure to maintain prices have, until recently, failed. See Handler, 
Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 RECOR.D OP N.Y.C.B.A. 362, 
367 (1960) and cases cited. Plaintiffs relying on unilateral refusal to deal for 
reasons other than price maintenance have fared no better. See Barber, Refusal 
to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 860 (1955) 
and cases cited. 
6. The duality requirement mar defeat the plaintiff's action in two ways. 
It may be found that the entire dIstribution policy of the supplier is unilateral 
and, hence. unobjectionable. E.g., Leo J. Meyberg v. Eureka Williams Corp., 
215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954). Alternatively, 
it may be found that, while a multilateral distributive scheme may exist, 
the supplier's dealings with the plaintiff were unilateral and, hence, unobjec­
tionable. E.{!., Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). 
7. E.g., Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954), cere. 
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954) . 
8. 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
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and the retailer setting the "suggested" price, if proven, would 
establish the requisite duality of action, the later enforcement of that 
price by the manufacturer' and his agent was perfectly proper as a 
unilateral refusal to deal. 
. 
Of present interest are the court's conclusions relating to the 
necesity of public injury and the findiitg of lawful unilateral action 
in the statement of retail price coupled with 'the enforcement. pro­
gram. The public injury holding, which the opinion traces through 
an impressive list of cases, is somewhat peculiar in that no mention 
is made of either of the two most recent Supreme Court cases in 
point. In Klors Inc. v. Broadway-Hale,s one of the two unmentioned 
cases, . the Court found illegality under the antitrust laws to ·be 
synonymous with the "public injury" requirement for private actions, 
at least in those cases which demonstrated a tendency toward 
monopoly. The second unmentioned case, Radiant Burners Inc. v. 
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co./o appears to settle the "public 
injury" requirement more definitely; In a per curiam opinion, the 
Court dealt with the requisite burden of proof in a private action 
brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act and concluded: 
By § 1, Congress has made illegal: 'Every contract, combination 
. . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among, the 
several States .. .' Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, ... Congress having thus prescribed the criteria of the 
prohibitions, the courts may not expand them. Therefore, to state C!-
, claim upon which relief can be granted under that section, aUe- , 
gations adequate to show a violotion and, in a private treble dan'lage 
action, that' plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires.ll 
Although the case was again one which dealt with a multipartite 
decision the effect of which might be similar to the Klors effect, the . 
language of the opinion appears unqualified. It would seem that the 
"public in jury" test has been read out of priv<I;te antitrust suits by 
the Supreme Court only to be reintroduced by T ohman. 
Analyzing the duality of action requirement, the court in T obman 
:Juotes at length from the recent Parke-Davis case and concludes that 
that opiniol), allows refusals to deal so long as there is no combina­
:ion between the partieS� The fact that the price set was enforced 
,y shoppers . apparently was considered irrelevant, the courtco!1-
9. 3 59 U.S. 207 (1959). 
10. 3 64 U.S. 656 (1961). 
11. ld. at 660. · 
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duding that as to  the manufacturer's · maintenance 'of price "there 
are rio facts· from which the existence of a contract, Combination. or 
conspiracy, can be inferred."12
· . . 
. In another case following the sani� approach,18 a similar arrange-  
ment was presented not in a complaint but as a defense to an action 
for trademark infringement. The House of Dior brought suit against 
Alexander's Department Store for misuse of the name "Dior" in 
connection with the sale ofa copy of the famous design house's 
styles. Among other allegations in the answer, the defendants claimed 
that the contracts made by Dior with merchants who were author­
ized to use the Dior styles and name violated the antitrust laws of 
the United States. Those contracts ·required that the customers, as 
a prerequisitie to using the Dior name at all, refrain from using· the 
name on any copies which were to be retailed at less than one hun'; 
dred dollars ,and that they require the same agreement of any cus� 
tomer-retailer to whom they might sell. Though the answer contained 
an allegation of a. conspiracy by several of the customers and Dior 
to eliminate Alexander's as a competitor, this allegation was aban­
doned on argument and not considered by the court. Denying that 
the answers entitled defendant to summary judgment, the court 
stated: · ... ' .' 
The refusal here to sell unless the required promise is given is  a 
legitimate, though. perhaps practically unenforceable device for 
creating in the mind of the purchasing public an association betWeen 
Dior copies and good material, workmanship and seIVice. If retailers 
are required to charge $100 in order to state that what they a� 
selling is a Dior copy they will tend to give the quality of material, 
workmanship and seIVice for which the public is willing to pay 
$100. The plan does not come within the interdiction of the recent 
United States v. Parke Davis. & Co. against refusal to sell as a 
means of constructing a combination or conspiracy to fix reSale 
prices.H . ' 
On the other hand, even before Park�-Davis, the Seventh Circuit 
took a different view of similar facts. In A. C. Becken' Co .. v. Gemex 
':orp.,lG the plaintiff had been cut off from further supplies because 
12. Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Cal. 
[961). .  
13. Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cot�)nniere, Etablissements Boussac v. 
\lexander's Department Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). 
14. rd. at 600. ' 
_ '  
, .  
15. 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960). 
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it refused defendant's demands to maintain the prices .set by the 
defendant for his own products and the prices of defendanes com- . 
petitor's brands. The defendant had elicited promises to maintain 
both his and his competitor's prices from other retailers who sold. 
Gemex products in the plaintif's vicinity and had shaken hands over 
it with them. Reversing the District Court's holding th�t the facts 
alleged did not state a claim for which relief could be granted,· �e 
Court of Appea1s held that the right to refuse to deal was a limited 
. right and, without detailing in what respects this arrangement had 
transgresed the limits of the right, found the conduct in question.·. 
illegal and remanded the case  to the District Court solely to ascer­
tain damages. 
Tobman,16 Alexandersl'l and Gemex18 all deal with a price-fixing 
scheme enforced through the seller's refusal to deal with price cut­
ters. The facts of Gemex, however, are somewhat different from 
those of the other two cases. In Gemex the seller demanded not 
only adherence to his own prices, but also adheren�e to the . prices 
of his competitors. While· this distinction, once duality of action is 
granted, would hardly be necesary since price-fixing itself would be 
sufficient to establish a violation of Section 1 of the Shennan Act,!' 
it is an aggravating factor" to be considered in' analyzing the allegedly. 
unilateral nature of the action. If Parke-Davis stands for the propo­
sition that combination may be implied from a scheme of price-fixing 
that departs from Doric simplicity, the inclusion of the whole line 
of products rather than only the one offered for sale ought to be a 
good starting point in finding lack of simplicity. Certainly a manu­
facturer could decide that his best interests are served by requiring 
adherence to the prices suggested for the whole line of competititive 
goods without combining or conspiring. If the retailer is not bound 
to adhere to the prices of other manufacturers and if the price 
suggested for his own product includes a wider margin of profit than 
it otherwise might (as must be asumed to be the usual case in in­
stances where retailers balk at charging the price suggested) the net 
result of price fixing may be to divert the retailer's efforts to dis­
counting competitor's goods with a consequent loss of sales to the 
manufacturer. Even this analysis, however, will only explain the 
actions of a seller in a market where both he and his competitors 
16. Supra note 12. 




18. A. C. Becken Co. v .
. 
Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959); ceTt. 
denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960). . 
19. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
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are selling at prices in exces of those that would be competitively 
established by the defecting sellers. Such a position, in turn, suggests 
a monopolistic condition in the market, which itself would taint 
the refusal to sell. To some extent, of course, the analysis of monopo:­
listie position is equally applicable to a single seller's demand that 
his own product be sold at a given price. 
Alternatively, if Parke-Davis suggests that a combination may be 
implied from a series of confertnces with retailers, does not the ad­
ditional element of the demr.d for price stability in the entire line 
of goods strengthen the inference that a multilateral scheme is being 
employed to shore up the price? Is it not less likely that a single 
seller, acting only through demands on his customers is able to 
manipulate not only his own price but its interrelationship with 
the prices of others? 
While Gemex presents unique circumstances that might allow it 
to take its place beside the other price-maintenance cases, George W. 
Warner Co., Inc. v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, 
Inc.20 meets the price-maintenance issue head on. In that case, 
plaintiff alleged that he was cut off from supplies after he refused 
to withdraw a bid he had made on a New York City Housing 
Authority contract. The bid price was below the price set by the 
:lefendant for his product and defendant had announced its policy 
)f refusal to deal with anyone not maintaining its .price. The District 
�ourt, finding that the complaint did not allege that the retailers 
lad conspired among themselves or with Black and Decker to main­
:ain the price, found the actions of the defendant to be unilateral 
md, hence, unimpeachable. The Court of Appeals reversed the Dis • 
. rict Court's decision, citing among other cases the Parke-Davis case 
vhich had been decided between the decision. of the District Court 
md the conclusion of the appeal. It found that the complaint 
}roiight the case within the doctrines of Beech-Nut21 and Parke­
)avis sufficiently to allow trial though it did state, rather ambigu­
,usly: 
Of course, it will be necessary for plaintiff to sustain the alJegations 
by the neces�ary proof because it would appear from the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in the Parke, Davis case that the 
Colgate principles have not been completely dest;royed. The Supreme 
Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may 
20. 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960). 
21. FTC v. Beech-N.ut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
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pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric sim­
plicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business 
enterprise. . . . The only question presently before the court is 
whether the amended complaint is sufficient for that purpose. A 
fair reading of the pleadings as a whole leads to the conclusion of 
such sufficiency . . .22 
Since the plaintiff had alleged that the scheme complained of wa" 
the result of combination and conspiracy, it is not clear what p�o!,f 
the Court of Appeals would require. Defendant did not deny that 
he had used threats of refusal to deal as a means of price setting 
nor that plaintiff had been cut off from supplies because of his 
failure to follow the required price, so apparently neither of those 
facts would present considerable proof problems at trial. While the 
opinions do not state whether the plaintiff alleged that the other 
Black and Decker dealers did maintain the prices as demanded, it 
is a fair asumption from the facts given and, at any rate, would not 
be difficult to prove at trial. It is also reasonable to assume that the 
proof of a conspiracy between the manufacturer and dealers, or 
among dealers, need not show a conspiracy expressly aimed at ex­
cluding the plaintiff from the trade. Such conspiracy does not seem 
to be within the language of the complaint and finding for the 
plaintiff on such a reading of the complaint would not require 
deciphering the Colgate23 - Parke-Davis line of cases whiCh the opin- . 
ion meticulously attempts. Al that appears to remain is a require­
ment that plaintif offer some proof that the price-maintenance 
scheme was achieved as the result of a concert of action rather than 
solely as the result of the statement of policy by the defendant. No 
indication is given as to the actual amount of proof required to 
allow a finding of implied conspiracy as was found in Parke-Davis. 
Despite its lack of definition of the scope of its holding, Black and 
Decker seems more in line with the cases instituted by the govern­
ment than does either Tobman or Alexanders. In Tobman, the 
policing policy seems reminiscent of the enforcement policy which 
was found so objectionable in Beech-Nut24 and, for all that when 
the court decided the motion, it was aware that there might well 
22. George W. Warner Co. v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Company, 
277 F.2d 787, 790 (2nd Cir. 1960). 
23. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
24. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922). The court dis­
tinguished the scheme in Beech-Nut from permissible refusal to deal primarily 
on the efFectiveness of the Beech-Nut policing. Customers were required to 
participate in enforcement. 
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have been customer cooperation in enforcement as well':oI�, Since, con­
spiracy was alleged in both Tobman and Alexanders, it is difficult 
to understand why proof might not have brought the schemes within 
the interdiction of Parke-Davis. If Radiant Burner;' has equated 
private and public actions in regard to the illegality required in each, 
Black and Decker would seem to correctly state the law. 
Threat of refusal to deal has been used to accomplish aims other, 
than price maintenance. One, objective, sometimes accomplished by 
, >Dch threat, is tying. A seller may refuse to, sell product A (the 
:ying product) for which there, is a good demand unless the buyer 
will also buy product B (the tied product) for which the demand 
nay not be as great. While such conduct on an economically ad­
lanced level runs the risk of being upset by a suit by the govern­
nent, until recently the non-complying dealer had little chance of 
'ecovery in a private suit against his supplier. , , 
Once one disposes of the public injury concept, this is another 
lrea in which refusal to deal raises interesting problems in di$in­
�i�hing between unilateral permissible conduct and bilateral con­
luct or conduct which is the equivalent of bilateral conduct. The' 
luaJity of action in the tying case is, of course, likely to run between 
he manufacturer or wholesaler and the retailer. Unlike the pricing 
:ases in which it is usually necessary to obtain the cooperation of a, 
lUmber of retailers, tying can be worked,; out on an individual basis. 
rhis distinction brings into sharp focus �e need for analysis of the 
ransactions between buyer and seller because reference to an im­
.lied conspiracy between' the supplier, and his other customers wil 
,ot decide the difficult questions. Where the tying pattern is repeti­
ive throughout the sales of a given product, however, and the manu­
lcturer refuses to sell to anyone not following the pattern, the possi­
'ility of the conspiracy analysis of the resale price maintenance cases 
: renewed. ' 
IIi Osborn v. Sinclair,2T the Fourth Circuit was faced with an 
greement which it analyzed solely in terms of the dealingsl:Jetween 
Ie two immediate parties. Sinclair, which had granted a lease to 
)sborn for a Sinclair filling station, brought pressure over a period 
r years on Osborn to buy greater quantities of tires, batteries and 
25. One act of cooperation is alleged in the complaint. The "shopper" 
ho discovered plaintiff's deviation was informed to investigate the matter by 
.mpeting merchants. ' , ' , 
26. Radiant Burners Inc. v. Peoples Gas" Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
961). . 
27. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. 
'nied,81 S. Ct. 1924 (1961). 
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accesories through them. According to the compla4tt, the company's. 
representatives .finally threatened not to renew.the lease unles, great­
er purchases were made. To retain the, lease for another year, OsbOrn 
, complied. When the situation recurred, at the erid of. the next year,.' 
Osborn refused to comply and the lease was cancelled. Finding  tha,t ' 
the original compliance established an illegal tying agrement, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismisl of the com-. 
plaint. A y.ear earlier, the same court had affirmed the dismis of·a 
similar complaint that differed mainIy in the fact ihat the supplier. ' 
there threatened to cancel a  dealership contract (under the 'pro., 
visions of the contract allowing short term cancellation) rather 
than refusing to renew an expired contract.28 
The court analysis in Osborn does not depend on an implied. 
conspiracy by the' manufacturer and other retailers to sell the line' 
of PrQductS in question altho�gh the facts might support �ch an 
. analysis: The illegal duality found is tbe action between the' de-' , 
fendant and the plaintiff: the' signing of the new lease after plain-  
tiff had succumbed to the demands to buy more TBA products. The 
approach leaves a number of questions unanswered. Little light is 
shed on the significance of formal lease negotiations as opposed to 
a mere statement by the manufacturer that there would be no fur- , 
ther dealings �� more'TBA products were bought. One wonders 
how much more is ·involved in such a transaction than surrender, to 
a demand made on refusal to deal. The only measure of certainty· 
that emerges  is that it was neces for the plaintif to agree to 
the demands made upon him, for that apparently provided the 
requisite duality. 
Going even more to fhC1 heart .9f dealership agreements is refi.isa.1 
to sell unles the dealer procures the manufacturer's supplies ex-
, clusively. It is, in fact, in such agreements expres or implied that the' 
concept of dealerships and area franchises thrives. Since exclusive . 
dealing under circumstances evidencing a substantial adverse eeo-' 
nomic effect on interstate commerce also violates the antitrust laws, 
this is another area that has seen a shift in treatment given by the' 
courts to, buyers who do not wish to comply with the conditionS 
imposed on their receipt of, supplieS. . 
. 
In Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,n the Sixth Circuit 
. 28. McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 3 3 2  .(4th Cir . 
• 959). The author has commented. on the Qistinction between the two cases. 
Alexander, Full-Line. Forcing of Less Than Requirements b" Threat of Refusal 
�o Deal - A. Per Se Violation'?, 12 SYltACUSl!. L. REv. 175 (1960). 
29. 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959). 
" 
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reversed the District Court's dismis of a complaint which alleged 
that the plaintif had lost his dealership because of failure to 'comply 
with the demands of the defendant that he use Ford parts almost 
exclusively in conducting his authorized Ford repair facility as part 
of his general dealership in Ford cars. While the complaint in part 
alleged monopolization by the defendant, the court also upheld the 
section of the complaint whicr. was based on the allegedly illegal 
requirement relating to parts. According to the court, if the condition 
requiring the use of Ford parts were proven at trial, all that would 
remain to make out a case would be proof that the argement 
had the effect of substantially lessening competition. 
Englander, as opposed to Osborn, does not seem to lay great stres; 
on initial compliance with the demands made by the manufacturer. 
It finds the condition one which would be illegal if made bilaterally' 
and hence one which may not be imposed by threat 'of refusal to 
deal, finding the right to refuse to deal a very limited right.80 
The cases commented on above are illustrative of current caSes 
concerned with refusal to deal where that device is used to achieve' 
a result which would be illegal if accomplished by the joint agree­
ment of the parties involved. A .few courts have gone further and 
have considered the right of a supplier to refuse to deal with a 
customer where such refusal is part of a scheme which would not be 
illegal if arrived at in concert with others ... 
In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,SI the plaintif 
complained that his aftion with the Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
. tem had been cancelled. According to the complaint, CBS was 
interested in obtaining a UHF television station in Milwaukee. After 
detennining that the plaintif's price for the UHF station which he 
was trying to sell was higher than it intended to pay, CBS, through 
an .. intennediary, took an option on the other UHF station in Mil­
waukee. It subsequently bought the other station and cancelled the 
plaintiff's network affiliation in order to asume that affiliation itself. 
Since the expensive equipment which plaintiff had bought while he 
was a network affiliate was not required in order to operate a purely 
local television station, he a.rged a swap of .equipment with the 
3 0, The complaint alleged that plaintif's franchise had been canceUed for 
non-compliance with·a condition imposed .by defen�t by express or implied 
agreement with aU customen. No mention was made of plaintifs . previous 
compliatiC,!' Though the opinion is n�t clear ,!n this point, it  to allow 
recovery if 'the resultS of the coerclve practices of defendant  about 
resu1� which would be unreasonable if accomplished by agreement. 
31. Poner v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 284 F.2d· 599 (D.C,· 
Cir. 1960). '. 
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defendant and was paid for the difference in value. Claiming 
intra-enterprise conspiracy and an attempt to monopolize, plaintif 
sought damages. The District Court, on a motion for summary judg­
ment, dismisd the complaint and the Court of Appeals affinned, 
Judge Washington dissenting. He thought that the plaintiff ought to 
be allowed to prove, among other things, that the purchase was an 
illegal restraint of trade because it would discourage competition 
in the Milwaukee area or in other places. The rationale of that part 
of the disent. appears to be that a ,seller may restrain trade by takiBg 
over a distributive afate without the action necesrily being an 
act of monopolization. 
While the dissenting opinion shows concern for a claimant who is 
certainly the victim of superior economic' power in the hands of the 
defendant, . it is a little difficult to make out a case of restraint of 
trade in a situation in which the number of suppliers and their rela­
tive positions in the market remain unchanged. The disnting opin­
ion concedes that there would have been no restraint of trade if the 
station franchise had been granted to some.one else.32 What makes 
it potentially restraining, according to the opinion, is that the radio 
network itself assumed control. This distinction, while quite appro­
priate if monopolization were in isue, is inappropriate to a Section. 1 
Sherman Act charge. More likely, the opinion should be taken as an 
asrtion that the economic club of refusal to deal may not be used 
for grie,:,ances not connected with the .adequacy of representation of 
the dealer's product in situations of suc.h disparity of power. 
In another interesting case, P. W. Husserl Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern 
CO.,33 the plaintiffs complained that after they began suit against 
the defendant for other antitrust violations, he refused to deal with 
them further. The Court granted a preliminary injunction forbidding 
the defendants to refuse to deal with the plaintiffs. The court's 
rationale is summarized in one of the paragraphs of the opinion: 
In the case at bar the refusal to deal is a bold attempt on the part 
. of the defendant Simplicity to deter litigants by economic coercion 
from pursuing the lawful remedies granted them by Congres under 
the anti-trust laws. Congress envisaged such private suitors as 
"allies of the government in enforcing the anti-trust laws". 51 
Cong. Rec. 16319 (1914). To pennit private suitors in that posi­
tion to. be coerced .�rom pursuing the remedies which Congres 
32. Id. at 608 n. 3 (dissenting opinion). 
33. 19� F. Supp;.55 (S.D. N.V, 1961). 
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gave them would frustrate the public policy which motivated Con: 
gress to grant such remedies. It would permit violators .of great 
economic strength to rest secure from remedial and punitive action 
by private litigants through the exercise of their economic power. 
Such a result cannot be tolerated by the courts if the policies . 
enunciated by Congress are to be carried out.s, .  
. 
The case is currently being appealed. If the District Court is affirmed  
in its conclusion, the opinion will go further than any prior decision' 
in limiting the right of refusal to deal as an economic weapon. 
From· the facts of the case, it seems clear that to .find an implied 
conspiracy by the nonsuing suppliers· is rather nonsensical. If the 
non-suing suppliers had actionable claims and did not exercise them 
it was certainly not because they' made the decision' as a matter . of 
self-interest akin to the self-interest which might motivate them to 
adopt a minimum pricing policy. Of even greater significance is the . 
fact that even if the agreement in question were made part of the 
sales contracts and signed by the sellers, there would be no precedent 
for holding the dual conduct to be in restraint of trade. It may 
well be that a contract not to sue for damages under these circum­
stances would be unenforceable as against public policy but even the 
staunchest advocates of expansion of the scope of antitrust have 
not yet equated ·an action against public policy with a restraint- of 
trade. " ., 
In considering hiS '�les 'policies today, a manufacturer would cer .. 
tainly be foolish if 'he were to act under the assumption that the 
:mly threat to his refusal to deal lay in suits by the government. 
Private litigants have increasingly been succesul in proving that . 
the customers may enforce the law in this area. In fact, treble damage 
mits may present an even greater financial challenge to the seller 
:haJl suit by the government.85 Irrespective of T obman and a num­
xr of earlier cases which interpose the "public injury" requirement 
:>etween an illegal act and a private suit by a damaged party, he 
:annot rely on immunity on this theory in any instance in which the 
:onduct would be found illeg�l in a s�it by the goveriunent. 
On the other hand, predictions to the contrary notwithstanding, a 
34. !d. at 61. 
35. The maximum penalty for Sherman Act violations if .fifty thousand' 
lollars. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Trebled 
lamages in large scale transactions may amount to considerably more. A single 
.'aintiff in Leow's Inc. v. Cinema Amusements, 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1954) 
,roved damages of one hundred thousand dollars. The trebled amount was, 
f course, three hundred thousand dollars. 
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, suppiier has ,not been compelled to sell to all wilg buyers to date: 
His right to choose customers on a basis rationally connected' to a 
policy ,of requiring appropriate representation of his goods,' and 
which does' not amount to an illegal combination if contracfually 
established with his dealers has also not been attacked. Thus, if a 
seller refuses to display the goods properly, uses the goods as a ,means 
of attracting customers to competitive items, etc.� it would seem qUite 
permissible to threaten, cancellation of business dealings unIes,s th� 
situation were remedied. It appears equally unobjectionable for ,the 
'manufacturer. or supplier to cancel contractual relations With such 
dealer either after or without such warning. 
' 
Although the Husserl case and the dissenting opinion iri PolleT 
seem to suggest that the use of economic coer don can be equated ' 
with restraint of trade and then merely judged on the basis of, rea­
sonableness, this view Seems unsupported by other decisions. Even 
if CoigateS6 had been overruled, actions which do not violate the 
substantive provisions of the antitrust laws would still seemingly' be 
immune from suit. The lesser qualification of Colgate which has , 
actually taken place still cannot be read as establishing a new anti-
trust law capable of supporting private suit.sT . 
More difficult are 'the cases dealing with conditions imposed by 
refusal to deal where the conditions .would be illegal if contractually 
arrived at. Two separate problems are-presented. The first concerns 
those arrangements, such as price maintenance, from which the 
sellers 'benefit as well as the, manufacturer. While a seller may wish 
to retain the benefits of being able to undersell his competitors, he . 
has much to gain from a general moratorium on price competition.' 
Indeed, in many cases, one might suspect that the demand for price 
fixing originated with the sellers. In such mutual benefit cases there 
is nothing illogical in allowingihe trier of fact to imply a conspiracy 
in the acquiescence of the sellers to their supplier's demands. It is 
likely that each dealer was informed that the policy to which he was 
asked to adhere was also to be required from the other dealers. What 
in form might be abject adherence results in an effective method of 
horizontal agreement among the dealers. A similar analysis might be 
36. Supra note 23. ' 
- . 
. 37. The statutory provision allowing treble damage suits, § 4 of the Clayton 
Act, is expressly limited to damage caused by "reason of anything forbidden 
.in the antitrust lawl' (emphasis added) 38 STAT. 731, (1914), 15 U.S.C . . §  15" 
, (1958). Injunctive relief, granted by § 16 of the Clayton Act, is premised on 
"a violation of the antitrust laws," 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 
(1958). ' 
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applied to some tying and exclusive dealing arrangements which 
result in a greater volume or range of sales by the manufacturer but 
also guarantee the dealer an exclusive sales territory or, at least, 
more limited competitition in the goods he sells. 
If the court will imply a conspiracy to maintain the price of the 
product or to divide markets, there is little reason to prevent a suit 
by an excluded non-complyin,; prior customer. The agreement 
among the dealers, which is hypothecated, surely contains not only 
the suggestion that all will comply but also that non-compliers will 
no longer be supplied. If this likely provision is also "implied" or, 
actually found, the case is even more clearly supportable on' the 
theory of price fixing or market sharing but now the additional theory 
of the boycott would certainly seem to make itself available though 
the courts have not, as yet, adopted the latter rationale. 
There remains the question, as yet unanswered, whether a con­
spiracy may be or wil be implied in such circumstances. In Gemex, 
the court found the arrangement itself sufficient. In the' Black and 
Decker case, on the other hand, the opinion suggested that more 
remained to be proven. At a minimum, one would think' that the 
manufacturer could still prove that the scheme was purely unilat­
erally imposed without either active participation or wil�ng ac­
quiescence by his customers. Beyond that, since the conduct is" 
after all, illegal when it is the result of joint., action, the manufac­
turer would be well advised that his position is most tenuous. 
The second problem arises in those cases in which a conspiracy, 
cannot reasonably be implied, as in a great, number of tying cases. 
Osborn and Englander suggest that the acceptance of the condition 
itself by the dealer constitutes the duality required to bring the case 
within the scope of the appropriate portions of the antitrust law. 
Finding duality in compliance with the demands of the manu­
facturer would, of course, simplify the price-maintenance cases 
greatly. It would effectively overrule the Colgate doctrine a�d make 
the implied conspiracy doctrine discussed earlier unnecessary. There 
is little indication, however, of transferrence of the rationale to the 
pricing cases. Perhaps the nature of the restraints imposed suggests 
the reasons for a stricter interpretation in the cases which concern 
demands by the manufacturer to take larger quantities of his goods. 
In the pricing cases, the manufacturer relinquishes his goods before 
his condition is met. His condition is imposed not on the trans­
action then occurring but on future transactions. If the dealer 
chooses to cut ,prices, he may still do so; albeit at the risk of losing 
• 
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future supplies. Furthermore, if dealers are inclined to bolt from the' 
suggested priceS, the manufacturer may· be forced to establish a  
sufficiently complex enforcement scheme to move himseH away from 
his immune position as a single trader. In the tying and exclusive 
dealing cases, however, once the orders are placed the manufacturer 
has achieved everything that he demanded: the dealer has bought . 
the tied product or taken his requirements of supplies from him. 
Unfortunately, this line of analysis seems to require acceptance of 
the condition at least once in order to' establiSh the illegal duality., 
A subsequent  cancellation of dealings when the dealer fails to renew 
the offending arrangement seems, however, to be within the scope 
of the damages arising from the initial demand.ss 
 
The apparent trend toward incapacitating demands for illegal 
schemes made on refusal to deal with non-compliers should not be 
viewed with too great alarm. To be 'sure, the right to choose o�e's , 
customers is an impOJ:tant segment of a free economy and ·sho�ld be. 
left intact to the extent possible. For just that reason, even economic 
disparity between the parties should not prohibit the use of refusal 
to deal to gain economic advantage or to terminate dealings with 
customers who have become offensive ·for one reason or another ... If 
an answer is to be supplied for cases such as Poller and Husserl it 
should come from an attempt to deal with the inherent inequities 
in the situation itself. In both cases, sonie legislation is currently 
applicable.89 Whether the legislation is adequate should not be de­
cided under the guise of antitrust action. Economic disparity may 
itself lead 'to antitrust violation when it rises to the monopolization 
level.40 Short of that, the underlying rationale seems to' favor com­
petition as a regulator. A right to buy, as such, is elemental to a 
regulated economy but inimical to the prevailing system. 
Allowing private litigants to bring .suit against suppliers on much 
the same evidence which would justify a governmental claim does 
not change the substantive law of refusal to deal. A given scheme is 
38. In Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558(1951) 
the Supreme Court held that, having etsablished a conspiracy to force General 
Motors dealers to use GMAC, "it therefore was necessary for petitioners only 
to introduce . . • evidence of the impact of the conspiracy on them, such as 
cancellation of their franchises and the purpose of General Motors in cancelling 
them, and evidence of any resulting damages." Id. at 571. 
39. The CBS power is limited by FCC regulation. In fact, acquisition of a 
UHF station was held up pending the adoption by the FCC of the 5·2 rule 
which allowed networks to acquire up to 2 UHF stations. In HUSSlrl, the plain­
tiff was bringing suit based on a statute designed in part to overcome his 
economic inequality vis a vis his supplier: the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 
1526 (l936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958). 
'40. �astman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials Co .• 273 U.S. 359 '(1927). 
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stil either innocent or illegal. It does,however, suggest the likelihood 
of a much' greater level. of enforcement than would otherwise be 
possible. A customer who has had his dealings with his supplier ter-  
minated has little reason for not suing.·The government in.iis enforce-· 
ment program must, of necessity, choose among many pptentially 
offending dealers since it lacks the resources to investigate and prose� 
cute all firms against which complaints are lodged. , 
,In the price. ma.hltenance cases, this wil mean that most of the 
plans in current operation which do not fal within the framework 
of fair trade laws may be tested in court. Since price, fixing is one of 
the per se offenses, 41 the plaintiff wil merely have to prove the 
"implied conspiracy" and his own damages. If such comparative ease 
of proof means that it wil no longer be feasible to use refusill to 
deal to set retail prices, there seems little reason· to regret the results .. 
In those states which feel that legitimate ends are servt;d by retail 
price fixing, the fair trade laws allow a. great measure of latitude.fa 
In the other states, where either the legislature48 or the COUrts44 have . 
found fair trading not to be in the public interest, the justification 
for pricing based on refusal to deal is slight . 
. In the cases where the supplier demands purchase of a. line of 
goods or exclusive dealing, the results will not be as dramatic. Neither ,­
offense is illegal per se.45 T�us,the dealer must prove not only the 
scheme, his sometime adherence (to esta,blish the requisite duality). 
or a conspiracy, but also that the effect of the plan has the requisite 
adverse affect on commerce.4S In considering the effect on commerce, 
the courts will be free to exonerate the suppliers whose programs are 
justifiable because of economic necesity. 
' 
A supplier will still be free to choose his customers with an eye to 
his own economic welfare. If the customer does not as in the pro­
�otion of the product being sold, he may be left without further 
supplies. In his right to refuse to deal, the supplier maintains the 
power to command competition for his product among retailers and 
thereby to command proper facilities and services in the sale of his 
41. United States v. Trenton Potteries 'Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) . 
42. The provisions of state acts are summarized at 11 3003-3008 TRADE REO. 
REP. 
43. Only five states do not have legislative provisions concerning fair trade. 
44. A number of state courts have declared fair trade laws unconstitutional. 
E.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White, 275 S.W.2d 455 (Ark. 1955) ; 
a chart of state rulings concerning' the constitutionality of 'fair trade laws is 
presented at 113003 TRADE REG. REP. 
45. FTC v. Sinclair Refining, 261 U.S. 463 (1923) (tying); Tampa Electric 
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (exclusive dealing) . ., 
46. Englande,r Moton, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959) . 
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product. Use of 'refusal to deal for such ptirposes is in accord with the  
philosophy of a free econoQ'ly. Absent an offensive condition on . ·  
continued dealing, a supplier should feel safe in choosing his cus-  
tomers. The courts wil not likely force him to change his policies either 
at the behest of the government or of a private suitor. 
